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THE WHOLE WIDE WORLD: RECOGNIZING 
JUS COGENS VIOLATIONS UNDER 
THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE 
Ursula Tracy Doyle t 
INTRODUCTION 
In August 2014, the international community learned that members of 
the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) had committed widespread 
human rights abuses-including but not limited to sexual slavery, torture, 
and killing-against the Yazidis,l a religious community 2 with origins in 
Iraq.3 Two years later, a United Nations commission declared the ongoing 
activity genocide.4 The commission urged the United Nations Security 
Council to refer the matter to the International Criminal Court or to create 
t Associate Professor of Law, Salmon P. Chase College of Law (Chase), Northern 
Kentucky University; Cornell University, A.B.; Columbia University, M.A.; Indiana 
University-Bloomington School of Law, J.D. I thank the following for their very helpful 
comments on earlier drafts of this article: George E. Edwards, Jena Martin and partici-
pants in the Chase Faculty Scholarship Workshop. I also thank the members of the 
BUFFALo HUMAN RIGHTS LAw REVIEW for their excellent editorial assistance. Any and 
all errors herein are, of course, my own. 
1. United Nations Human Rights Council, Thirty-Second Session, Independent In-
ternational Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (Commission), A/HRC/ 
32/CRP.2 (June 15, 2016). 
2. Id. at 3. 
3. Id. 
4. The Commission details the Yazidis treatment by ISIS as follows: 
ISIS has sought to destroy the Yazidis through killings; sexual slavery, enslave-
ment, torture and inhuman and degrading treatment and forcible transfer causing 
serious bodily and mental harm; the infliction of conditions of life that bring about 
a slow death; the imposition of measures to prevent Yazidi children from being 
born, including forced conversion of adults, the separation of Yazidi men and wo-
men, and mental trauma; and the transfer of Yazidi children from their own fami-
lies and placing them with ISIS fighters, thereby cutting them off from beliefs and 
practices of their own religious community, and erasing their identity as Yazidis. 
The public statements and conduct of ISIS and its fighters clearly demonstrate that 
ISIS intended to destroy the Yazidis of Sinjar, composing the majority of the 
world's Yazidi population, in whole or in part. 
Id. In August 2017, the Iraq Government requested the assistance of the UN Secur-
ity Council in holding ISIS accountable for crimes against humanity. See Letter from 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq Addressed to United Nations Secre-
tary General: From Republic of Iraq (Aug. 14, 2017). https://en.calameo.com/read/ 
005253664097abb2342ef 
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an ad hoc tribunal to address these atrocities.5 Because of their heinousness, 
genocide, torture, and a small group of other acts are, at international law, 
considered jus cogens violations, a calumny to every nation.6 Also known 
as universal offenses, these acts are the business of every State, their rem-
edy every State's responsibility.7 Given their global character, efforts at 
their redress, at least theoretically, carry reduced comity risks." 
However, despite the gravity of the harm inflicted on the Yazidis by 
ISIS perpetrators and the imputed offense of the international community, 
at this writing, the International Criminal Court has not prosecuted an ISIS 
perpetrator and the United Nations has not convened a related ad hoc tribu-
nal. 9 The civil justice system available to the Yazidis may offer little more 
hope. There are obvious rule of law challenges in Iraq and Syria, casting 
doubt on the capacity of these States to vindicate human rights claims in a 
way that would provide recompense for harm. Additionally, in the United 
States, the landmark Alien Tort Statute (ATS)IO-which, in years past, pro-
vided jurisdiction to those similarly situated to the Yazidis-is in retreat. 
The ATS cannot serve as an option for the Yazidis if U.S. courts continue 
to narrowly read the recent United States Supreme Court cases Kiobel v. 
Royal Dutch Petroleum Shell and European Community v. RJR Nabisco to 
the end of foreclosing a claim of direct liability against a natural person for 
even the most extreme human rights atrocities because the conduct relevant 
to the claim did not literally occur in the territorial United States." 
The ATS states simply that "[t]he district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in 
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." 2 The statute 
provides jurisdiction only;'3 it does not provide a cause of action, as some 
5. 5. Id. at 1. 
6. See generally United Nations General Assembly, International Law Commis-
sion, Sixty-Ninth Session, Second Report on Jus Cogens, Dire Tladi, Special Rap-
porteur, March 16, 2017 (Second Report) [hereinafter: Tladi, Second Report]. 
7. Id. 
8. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 762 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in judgment). 
9. To date (May 29, 2018), the International Criminal Court has not opened a case 
concerning the ISIS persecutions. Likewise, to date, no ad hoc tribunal has been estab-
lished to address these persecutions. 
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1948). 
11. See generally Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 569 U.S. 108 (2013); Euro-
pean Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2090 (2016). 
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
13. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724 ("[T]he ATS is a jurisdictional statute creating no new 
causes of action . . . ."). 
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courts once thought.1 4 The Supreme Court made this much needed clarifica-
tion in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, its first foray into the morass that has 
become ATS jurisprudence.' 5 Notwithstanding this clarification, there re-
main questions about the statute's operation, particularly since Kiobel, in 
which the Court held that the statutory canon of interpretation known as the 
"presumption against extraterritoriality" applies to the ATS.1 6 According to 
the Court, this presumption protects international relations as it prevents 
U.S. courts from adjudicating matters that principally occurred overseas.' 7 
The presumption means what its name implies: "[that] '[w]hen a statute 
gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none.""8 
The Court further held that the presumption applied to the ATS can only be 
displaced if the claim alleged pursuant to the statute "touch[es] and con-
cem[s]"' 9 the United States "with sufficient force." 2 0 The Court suggested 
that lower courts make this determination by identifying the location of the 
"relevant conduct" that gave rise to the claim. 2 1 
Prior to Kiobel, plaintiffs had some, if not much, success bringing 
human rights claims under the ATS, including where the conduct giving 
rise to the claim occurred in a foreign State and all the parties were foreign. 
There was no requirement pre-Kiobel that a claim have a U.S. connection, 
whether literal or metaphorical, to ground subject matter jurisdiction under 
the statute. Many types of claims worked to sustain ATS jurisdiction: those 
against natural 22 and juridical 23 persons, those alleging direct 24 and indi-
14. Id. ("The jurisdictional grant is best read as having been enacted on the under-
standing that the common law would provide a cause of action for the modest number 
of international law violations with a potential for personal liability at the time."); Ki-
obel, 569 U.S. at 115 ("The statute provides district courts with jurisdiction to hear 
certain claims, but does not expressly provide any causes of action."); see also Ingrid 
Wuerth, The Alien Tort Statute and Federal Common Law: A New Approach, 85 No-
TRE DAME L. REv. 1941 (2010), for a thorough discussion about the interrelationship 
between international law and federal common law in ATS jurisprudence. 
15. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 692. 
16. Kiobel, 569 U.S.at 117. 
17. Id. at 115-16. 
18. Id. at 115 (quoting Morrison v. NationalAustraliaBank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 
248 (2010)). 
19. Id. at 124-25. 
20. Id. at 125. 
21. Id. at 124. 
22. Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 1996); Filartigav. Pena-Irala, 
630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322 (N.D. Ga. 
2002); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995). 
23. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009); Bowoto v. Chevron, 557 F. 
Supp. 2d 1080 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
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rect2 5 liability, those with 2 6 and without2 7 U.S. connections, and those with 
admixtures of the above. 
This seemingly "come one, come all" approach to ATS jurisdiction has 
spawned numerous debates about the proper scope of the statute. 28 Kiobel 
settled few of them 29 and created more. Indeed, it held that the plaintiff 
must allege some meaningful U.S. connection for the law of nations viola-
tion to be recognized under the ATS. 30 It did not, however, provide any 
guidance for determining what satisfies. It did not discuss the particular 
type of person (natural or juridical) subject to ATS jurisdiction. It did not 
address the kind of liability (direct or indirect) recognized under the statute. 
It did not consider the significance of the type of international law violation 
alleged (jus cogens or not). 
24. Abebe-Jira, 72 F.3d 844; Filartiga,630 F.2d 876; Mehinovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 
1322. 
25. In re MarcosHuman Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992); Xuncax, 886 
F. Supp. 162. 
26. Abdullahi, 562 F.3d 163; Bowoto, 557 F. Supp. 2d 1080. 
27. In re Marcos Human Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493; Filartiga,630 F.2d 876; 
Mehinovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322. 
28. Beth Stephens, Translating Fildrtiga:A Comparative and InternationalLaw 
Analysis of Domestic Remedies for InternationalHuman Rights Violations, 27 YALE J. 
INT'L L. 1, 44 (2002) ("As applied to the broad range of transnational law litigation, 
including Fildrtiga-typecases, the key step is to recognize that his well-established 
international law doctrine authorizes jurisdiction over civil claims as well as criminal 
prosecutions.") (emphasis added); Charles F. Marshall, Re-Framing the Alien Tort Act 
After Kadic v. Karadzic, 21 N.C. J. INT'LL. & COM. REG. 591, 612-13 (1996) ("Filar-
tiga never confronts the historical evidence pointing out the real purpose of the original 
§ 1350: to allow aliens to bring suits in U.S. federal courts in order to avoid a foreign 
conflict with the alien's home state. Allowing [this] jurisdiction . . . might often trigger 
the opposite effect of instigating such conflict.") (citation omitted); Kenneth C. Randall, 
FederalJurisdictionOver InternationalLaw Claims: Inquiries into the Alien Tort Stat-
ute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'LL. & POL. 1, 71 (1985) ("In the aftermath of Filartigav. Pena-
Irala, federal courts have frequently expressed confusion and disagreement concerning 
the meaning and application of the Alien Tort Statute."); see also Richard B. Lillich, 
Invoking InternationalHuman Rights Law in Domestic Courts, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 367, 
400-01 (1985) ("Important as Filartigais in establishing that torture violates customary 
international law, the case is even more significant in demonstrating to lawyers the 
growing importance of customary international human rights law and graphically illus-
trating how they should go about proving it in cases before domestic courts."). 
29. See Mujica v. AirScan Inc., 771 F.3d 580, 594 (9th Cir. 2014) ("Kiobel (quite 
purposely) did not enumerate the specific kinds of connections to the United States that 
could establish that ATS claims 'touch and concern' this country."). 
30. See Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 124. 
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The Supreme Court further added to the uncertainty about the breadth 
of the statute with its decision in RJR Nabisco. Although this case did not 
concern the extraterritorial application of the ATS, it did concern the extra-
territorial application of a statute-the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Orga-
nizations Act (RICO) 3 1-thus giving the Court an opportunity to pronounce 
broadly on the approach that lower courts should take when confronted with 
the question of the extraterritoriality of any statute.3 2 The Court stated that 
lower courts must apply a two-step framework. They must: (1) consider 
"whether the statute gives a clear, affirmative indication that it applies ex-
traterritorially"; 33 and (2) if it does not, determine "[i]f the conduct relevant 
to the statute's focus occurred in the United States." 34 If such conduct oc-
curred in the United States, according to the Court, then the statute may be 
applied no matter "if other conduct occurred abroad." 35 If, however, rele-
vant conduct "occurred in a foreign country,"36 the Court opined, then ATS 
jurisdiction will not lie "regardless of any other conduct that occurred in 
U.S. territory."37 
In prescribing this framework, the Court noted that a statute's focus 
determines the kind of conduct that is relevant. However, it also observed 
that it had not previously identified the focus of the ATS. 3 8 (It did not do so 
in the instant case either.) Thus, to the already crowded Kiobel debate, RJR 
Nabisco adds new questions about relevant conduct, including its substan-
tive criteria and territorial limits. Kiobel certainly raised questions about 
relevant conduct but there the Supreme Court did not expressly prescribe a 
test or jurisdictional framework reliant on a consideration of this notion, 
allowing courts to determine independently if, when, and how they might 
consider relevant conduct when determining the propriety of ATS jurisdic-
tion. Subsequent o Kiobel, many courts have considered this concept when 
engaged in this inquiry.39 However, it was not until the Supreme Court de-
cided RJR Nabisco and enunciated its two-step framework that clarity re-
garding the meaning and scope of relevant conduct became essential. That 
clarity begs. The Court's recent decision in Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC like-
wise provides no answer to these questions. There, the Court held that "for-
31. RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2096 (2016). 
32. Id. 






39. See discussion infra at 21-25. 
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eign corporations may not be defendants in suits brought under the ATS." 40 
It reasoned that Congress, given its law-making and foreign policy-setting 
roles, must determine whether ATS liability should be extended to foreign 
corporations, not courts.4 1 While an unquestionably landmark decision, 
Jesnerdoes not expand or limit the capacity of the ATS to ground jurisdic-
tion over a claim of direct liability against a natural person for a jus cogens 
violation. That capacity continues to be determined by Jesner's antecedents 
Kiobel and RJR Nabisco. 
This article contends that the jurisprudential lacunae created by Kiobel 
and RJR Nabisco-regardingthe kind of liability, class of defendant, type 
of international law violation, and degree of extraterritoriality cognizable 
under the ATS-allow for the kind of claim that the Yazidis might bring 
pursuant to the statute. Despite the conduct relevant o their claim likely 
occurring entirely abroad, this group, foreign nationals, might be poised to 
sue their individual perpetrators, also foreign nationals, in the United States. 
Should they allege direct liability for genocide and torture, amongst other 
abuses, their claims would concern jus cogens violations.4 2 They would thus 
bring the now fraught "foreign-cubed claim," alleging that the defendants 
were directly liable for breaching the most sacrosanct of international law 
standards. 
That said, despite their clear injury, the Yazidis might be another set of 
similarly situated plaintiffs left remediless in the aftermath of Kiobel. Be-
cause these plaintiffs' claims were foreign-cubed, courts did not find any-
thing that displaced the presumption against extraterritoriality. 43 In other 
words, courts looked for relevant conduct in the territorial United States and 
found none. Thus, courts dismissed these claims, along with many of their 
kin, including those alleging aiding and abetting liability against both natu-
ral and juridical persons for jus cogens violations that occurred abroad.44 
Kiobel, however, does not appear to contemplate the significance of 
allegations of direct liability-whether for a jus cogens violation or not-
and nor does it appear to consider the significance of allegations against a 
natural person. 45 RJR Nabisco does not concern an ATS claim at all.4 6 As 
40. 40. 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1407 (2018). 
41. 41. Id. at 1407-1408. 
42. See discussion infra at 8-15. 
43. Id. 
44. See Ursula Tracy Doyle, The Evidence of Things Not Seen: Diving Balancing 
Factorsfrom Kiobel's "Touch and Concern" Test, 66 HASTINGs L. J. 443,444-45 
(2015). 
45. See generally Kiobel, 569 U.S. 108. 
46. See generally RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. 2090. 
51 2017-2018] The Whole Wide World 
noted, it regards the extraterritoriality of RICO,4 7 a legal scenario that does 
not lend itself to discussion about the nuances of claims brought pursuant o 
the ATS. It certainly does not fill in the blanks left by Kiobel concerning the 
substantive and territorial reach of the ATS. These cases, then, should not 
preclude the kind of claim ascribed here to the Yazidis. 
As many courts-domestic, foreign, and international-have ob-
served, jus cogens norms are in a class by themselves. 48 Because they are 
singular, this article asserts that the United States Supreme Court must 
clearly and expressly pronounce if all claims concerning their violation are 
insufficient to ground ATS jurisdiction without a territorial U.S. connec-
tion. This requirement seems particularly necessary in the case of a direct 
liability claim against a natural person given the immediacy of such a 
charge. A jus cogens claim pursuant to this construct is simply too serious 
to be subsumed by holdings directly responsive to an entirely different set 
of facts, requiring an entirely different legal analysis. This article, then, 
posits that neither Kiobel nor RJR Nabisco mandates the summary dismissal 
of the ATS claim that possesses the features of the would-be Yazidi case 
because that case would allege facts that the Supreme Court has not ex-
pressly precluded as a ground for recognizing ATS jurisdiction. 
Put another way, Kiobel and RJR Nabisco arguably leave room for the 
kind of claim, pursuant to the ATS, considered in the seminal case Filartiga 
v. Pena-Irala.49 There, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit recognized that torture is a violation of the law of nations and thus 
cognizable under the ATS. 0 It then concluded that ATS jurisdiction was 
proper in the case before it, which alleged direct liability for torture, and 
was brought by Paraguayan nationals against another Paraguayan national 
for conduct that occurred in Paraguay.51 Filartiga was the first of many 
47. Id. at 2098. 
48. See generally Tladi, Second Report supranote 6, at 11-13 (observing the nu-
merous courts that recognize and accord legal meaning to jus cogens norms, including 
the Supreme Court of Argentina, Swiss Federal Supreme Court, Supreme Court of 
Zimbabwe, International Court of Justice, International Criminal Tribunal for the For-
mer Yugoslavia, Court of First Instance of the Court of Justice of the European Union, 
European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights). 
49. Filartiga,630 F.2d at 876. 
50. Id. at 884 ("Having examined the sources from which customary international 
law is derived-the usage of nations, judicial opinions and the works of jurists-we con-
clude that official torture is now prohibited by the law of nations. The prohibition is 
clear and unambiguous, and admits of no distinction between treatment of aliens and 
citizens."). 
51. Id. at 878. This is the case that launched a thousand lawsuits as it demon-
strated to the world that the United States had a statute which allowed for subject matter 
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decisions, pre-Kiobel, where courts were apparently compelled by the grav-
ity of the alleged violation, allowing such an allegation to overcome any 
claim that the matter lacked a sufficient nexus with the United States to 
sustain subject matter jurisdiction under the ATS. 5 2 
In some of these cases, courts also considered the meaning at interna-
tional law of the jus cogens claim; they did not solely recognize the tragedy 
of the alleged facts that gave rise to the claim.53 They acknowledged that 
thejus cogens breach was the gravest at international law and caused global 
injury.54 These courts considered the significance of the jus cogens claim in 
ATS jurisprudence broadly but also in a subspecies of this jurisprudence 
involving foreign official immunity.5 5 This article suggests that an allega-
tion of direct liability for a jus cogens violation against a natural person 
warrants this level of scrutiny (and perhaps this is especially so when mass 
atrocity is at issue, as would be the case for the Yazidis). 
Part I of this article discusses the theoretical underpinnings of the jus 
cogens norm. Part II considers the treatment by courts, pre-Kiobel, of 
claims of direct liability against a natural person for jus cogens violations 
brought pursuant to the ATS. Part III discusses Kiobel and its implications 
for these claims. Part IV explores courts' handling of ATS cases with Filar-
tiga-type56 features post-Kiobel. Part V discusses RJR Nabisco and its 
meaning for ATS cases. Part VI discusses courts' handling of ATS cases 
with Filartiga-typefeatures post-RJR Nabisco.5 7 Part VII discusses the sig-
nificance of recent cases where courts allowed allegations of jus cogens 
violations to defeat foreign official immunity. Finally, Part VIII suggests 
how courts should decide the question of ATS jurisdiction, in light of these 
two cases, when the claimant alleges direct liability against a natural person 
for a jus cogens violation. 
jurisdiction over the most egregious human rights abuses, even if the parties were for-
eign and the offense occurred abroad. 
52. See discussion infra at 15-18. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. See discussion infra at 30-33. 
56. See Stephens, supra note 28, at 44 for an early use of this term. 
57. At this writing, there are only two cases post-RJR Nabisco that come close to 
being "Filartiga-types":Adhikari v. Kellogg, Brown & Root, 845 F.3d 184 (5th Cir. 
2017) and Salim v. Mitchell, 268 F. Supp. 3d 1132, 1136-39 (E.D. Wash. 2017). A 
foreign-cubed case, where the plaintiffs allege direct liability against a natural person 
for torture, Adhikari closely tracks Filartiga.By contrast, Salim is foreign-squared. The 
plaintiffs and place of injury are foreign but the defendants are U.S. nationals. The 
plaintiffs do, however, allege that these defendants are directly liable to them for tor-
ture. See discussion infra at 28-30. 
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I. Jus COGENS 
Per the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a jus cogens norm 
"is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of 
States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and 
which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international 
law having the same character." 8 The norm possesses the highest status of 
all international law,5 9 binds every State60 and endeavors to "protect the 
fundamental values of all human life." 61 While there are efforts to add to the 
list of jus cogens norms, 62 consensus exists for the peremptory status of 
genocide, torture, aircraft hijacking, war crimes, the slave trade, and the 
improvident use of force.63 The jus cogens norm (and its qualifying con-
duct) derives from customary international law and, like it, exists somewhat 
in the ether.64 However, unlike customary international law, the existence of 
the norm does not require State consent. 65 Moreover, unlike its customary 
kin, the jus cogens norm applies even to the persistent objector. 66 
Today there is increased interest in the idea of this norm. Recently, the 
United Nations General Assembly appointed a Special Rapporteur, Dire 
Tladi, to study the concept of jus cogens, and to issue a series of reports 
58. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 53, openedfor signature May 
23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980). In general, courts seem 
to follow the United States Supreme Court's lead in The PaqueteHabana, 175 U.S. 677 
(1900), regarding the elucidation of customary international aw, to determine how to 
identify a jus cogens norm. There, the Court opined that "where there is no treaty and 
no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the 
customs and usages of civilized nations, and, as evidence of these, to the works of 
jurists and commentators . . . ." Id. at 700. Pursuant to this approach, when determining 
which norms have risen to the level of jus cogens, courts consider the works of other 
courts and scholars. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 731-32; Siderman de Blake v. Argentina, 965 
F.2d 699, 714-19 (9th Cir. 1992); see generallyFlomo v. FirestoneNaturalRubber Co., 
643 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2007); Floresv. Southern Peru CopperCorp., 414 F.3d 233 (2d 
Cir. 2003). 
59. Tladi, Second Report supra note 6, at 12-14. 
60. Id. at 15. 
61. Id. at 10. 
62. See discussion infra, at n. 198. 
63. See Bigio v. Coca Cola, 239 F.3d 440, 448 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting with 
approval Rest. (Third) of Foreign Relations § 404 (1987)); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 
232 (2d Cir. 1995); Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite 
(Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. Reports 422, 457 (July 20). 
64. Tladi, Second Report, supra note 6, at 22-23. 
65. Id. at 14-15. 
66. Id. 
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documenting the origins, content, exercise, and enforcement of this norm.67 
To date, the Special Rapporteur has issued three reports, which discuss the 
69 history and past uses of the norm,68 the criteria for the norm, and the 
relationship of the norm to other sources and rules of international law. 70 In 
one report he observed the norm's pride of place, stating that "the norms of 
jus cogens protect the fundamental values of international law" 7 1and that 
"[t]his notion has never been seriously questioned." 72 Likewise, he reported 
that "the view that jus cogens norms are hierarchically superior to other 
rules and norms of international law is generally accepted." 7 3 
Given the seriousness and the supremacy of the norm, historically, its 
violation exposed the perpetrator to the exercise of universal jurisdiction on 
the theory that the conduct was so abhorrent that it offended the family of 
nations, thus allowing each of its members to hold the perpetrator accounta-
ble.74 Universal jurisdiction, at least theoretically, can be imposed crimi-
67. United Nations General Assembly, International Law Commission, Sixty-
Eighth Session, First Report on Jus Cogens, Dire Tladi, Special Rapporteur, March 8, 
2016, at 4 [hereinafter: Tladi, First Report]. The First Report noted that while many 
States supported the effort to increase understanding of the jus cogens norm some 
others questioned the propriety of this work altogether. The report observes that "[t]he 
United States 'did not believe it would be productive for the [International Law] Com-
mission to add the topic of jus cogens to its agenda.'" Id. at 5. It further observes that 
France was unsure that he Commission could reach "consensus," and that the Nether-
lands did not see where States were in need of clarification on the norm. Id. However, 
the report notes that "[m]any delegations reflected on the growth of jurisprudence on 
the topic of jus cogens" and that "Finland, speaking on behalf of the Nordic States, 
referred to decisions at both 'the international and national levels' invoking jus cogens." 
Id. at 6. 
68. 68. See generally Tladi, First Report, supra note 67. 
69. 69. See generally Tladi, Second Report, supra note 6. 
70. 70. See generally United Nations General Assembly, International Law Com-
mission, Seventieth Session, Third Report on Peremptory Norms of General Interna-
tional Law (Jus Cogens), Dire Tladi, Special Rapporteur, February 12, 2018. 
71. Tladi, Second Report, supra note 6, at 10. 
72. Id. at 11. 
73. Id. at 14-15. 
74. See Thomas Weatherall, Jus Cogens andSovereign Immunity: Reconciling Di-
vergence in ContemporaryJurisprudence,46 GEO. I. INT'L L. 1151, 1154 (2015) (rec-
ognizing that "the doctrine of jus cogens is a product of the same tradition of 
international law as the Nuremberg prosecutions that followed the Second World 
War."); Anthony J. Colangelo, What is ExtraterritorialJurisdiction?, 19 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1303, 1306-1307 (2014) (observing that "the concept of universal jurisdiction can 
transform exercises of extraterritorial jurisdiction into exercises of territorial jurisdiction 
because U.S. courts are applying the substance of an international law that covers the 
globe" and that "the international law of universal jurisdiction puts everyone every-
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nally or civilly. 5 Pursuant to the Restatement (Fourth) on Foreign 
Relations: 
International law recognizes a state's jurisdiction to prescribe law 
with respect to certain offenses of universal concern, such as geno-
cide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, certain acts of terrorism, 
piracy, slave trade and torture, even if no specific connection exists 
between the state and the persons or conduct being regulated. 76 
This power arguably allows a State, for example, to apprehend an al-
leged perpetrator of a universal offense and hold them accountable in a 
domestic criminal court.7 7 The Restatement further states that "universal ju-
risdiction as a matter of criminal law is well accepted under international 
law"7 8 but that "the permissibility and limits of universal civil jurisdiction 
remain controversial." 79 
Indeed, while there are numerous examples of the exercise of universal 
criminal jurisdiction, there are far fewer of its civil counterpart. However, 
before Kiobel, many courts in the United States, exercised universal civil 
jurisdiction pursuant to the Alien Tort Statute.80 Despite this history, some 
where on notice that they can be held to account anywhere for certain serious offenses 
against international law-such as piracy, torture, genocide, and terrorist acts like hos-
tage taking and plane bombing"); REST. (FOURTH) ON FOREIGN RELATIONS § 217 cmt. a 
(noting that "a state may exercise such jurisdiction with respect to an offense committed 
by a foreign national against a foreign national that took place outside its territory"); but 
see Eugene Kontorovich, Kiobel Surprise: Unexpected by ScholarsBut Consistent with 
InternationalTrends, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1671, 1673 (2014) (observing that "Ki-
obel can be understood as not involving the extraterritoriality presumption, but rather its 
more obscure cousin-the presumption against universality"). 
75. REST. (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 217 cmt. d. 
76. 76. Rest. (Fourth) of Foreign Relations § 217. 
77. See id. at § 217 cmt. b. International criminal tribunals may also seek to pur-
sue such an offense upon the tribunal's charter or other international agreement. Id. 
78. 78. Rest. (Fourth) of Foreign Relations § 217 cmt. d. 
79. 79. Id. 
80. 80. In Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 240 (2d Cir. 1995), the court opined 
that although universal jurisdiction is usually a criminal exercise, international law also 
allows for its civil expression under the ATS. Similarly, in Presbyterian Church of 
Sudan v. Talisman, the court stated that "states may exercise universal jurisdiction over 
acts committed in violation of jus cogens norms." 244 F. Supp. 2d 289 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003). The court continued that "[t]his universal jurisdiction extends not merely to 
criminal liability but may also extend to civil liability." See Ernest A. Young, Universal 
Jurisdiction,the Alien Tort Statute, and TransnationalPublic-LawLitigation After Ki-
obel, 64 Duke L. J. 1023, 1029, 1033 (2015) (asserting that "the ATS amounts to a 
uniquely American form of universal jurisdiction" and that "[u]niversal jurisdiction thus 
counts on domestic courts to enforce principles of international law"). 
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courts, including the United States Supreme Court, have raised questions 
about the scope of this license for fear that this expansive form of jurisdic-
tion will frustrate comity.8' This concern underlies the Court's decision in 
Kiobel.82 
A noble idea, borne of the desire of nations to tread lightly when their 
interests intersect with those of sister nations, comity has become a touch-
stone for courts confronted with foreign-featured cases, especially universal 
civil jurisdiction cases, typified by the pre-Kiobel ATS cases. 83 Indeed, the 
Supreme Court deemed the application of the presumption against extrater-
ritoriality to the ATS necessary to "protect against unintended clashes be-
tween [U.S.] laws and those of other nations." 84 It repeated this theme 
throughout Kiobel, further opining that "the danger of unwarranted judicial 
interference in the conduct of foreign policy is magnified in the context of 
the ATS, because the question is not what Congress has done but what 
courts may do."8 5 The Court also expressed concern that the application of 
the ATS to extraterritorial conduct could result in "other nations . . . apply-
ing the law of nations . . . [to] hale our citizens into their courts for alleged 
violations of the law of nations occurring in the United States, or anywhere 
else in the world." 86 (As this article attempts to show, pursuant to universal 
jurisdiction, this possibility already exists.) 
81. 81. The Supreme Court has also underscored the primacy of comity when 
determining the outer limits of general personal jurisdiction and the reach of a federal 
statute. In DaimlerAG v. Bauman, concerning allegations of corporate complicity in the 
human rights abuses during Argentina's "Dirty War," the Court opined that the 
"[United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit] . . . paid little heed to the risks 
to international comity its expansive view of general jurisdiction posed." 571 U.S. 117 
(2013). 
82. 82. See generallyKiobel, 569 U.S. 108. The Court also raises the comity issue 
in Jesner but, as noted above, decides the case on other grounds. 
83. Comity also provides a respectable explanation for a court's refusal to exercise 
the jurisdiction that it lawfully possesses. According to scholar William S. Dodge, over 
time the concept of comity has splintered into numerous principles-e.g., "prescriptive 
comity" ("deference to foreign lawmakers"), "adjudicative comity" ("deference to for-
eign courts") and "sovereign party comity" ("deference to foreign governments as liti-
gants"). International Comity in American Law, 115 COLUM. L. REv. 2071, 2099 
(2015). This complexity has served to confuse some courts and forestall some argu-
ments. Nonetheless, most likely few would argue against the propriety of a court con-
sidering comity when asked to adjudicate a matter with significant foreign features. 
84. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 115-16 (quoting EEOC v. ArabianAmerican Oil Co., 499 
U.S. 244, 248 (1991)). 
85. Id. 
86. Id. at 124. The Court reiterates this point, regarding the perceived vulnerability 
of corporations, in Jesner. See 138 S. Ct. at 1405-1406. 
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Additionally, many years before Kiobel, Justice Breyer, in his Sosa 
concurrence, expressed apprehension about the possibility of ATS litigation 
"undermin[ing] the very harmony that it was intended to promote."87 He 
noted that, in the foreign-cubed case, comity issues are especially prevalent. 
However, quite importantly, he opined that the prosecution of offenses that 
are subject to universal jurisdiction are inherently compliant with interna-
tional comity,8 8 observing that "[t]he fact that this procedural consensus ex-
ists suggests that recognition of universal jurisdiction in respect to a limited 
set of norms is consistent with principles of international comity." 89 Moreo-
ver, he opined that: 
[A]llowing every nation's courts to adjudicate foreign conduct in-
volving foreign parties in such cases will not significantly threaten 
the practical harmony that comity principles seek to protect. That 
consensus concerns criminal jurisdiction, but consensus as to univer-
sal criminal jurisdiction . . . suggests that universal tort jurisdiction 
would be no more threatening.90 
A categorical bar by the Court against the exercise of universal civil 
jurisdiction, on the ground that it thwarts comity, would starkly conflict 
with Justice Breyer's stated belief about the relationship between these two 
aspects of international law. This article contends that the Court did not go 
this far when it recognized that the presumption against extraterritoriality 
applied to the ATS and conduct relevant to the ATS claim must touch and 
concern the United States for ATS jurisdiction to lie. The Court assertedly 
did, however, speak to these matters out of a concern for comity, and in-
deed there is certainly evidence of foreign State pushback to the exercise of 
ATS jurisdiction. 
Perhaps the paradigmatic example of such resistance-even disdain-
to the exercise of universal civil jurisdiction pursuant to the ATS is South 
Africa. South African President Thabo Mbeki objected to this jurisdiction 
in In Re South African Apartheid Litigation, a group of ATS cases filed 
87. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 761 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
judgment). 
88. Id. 
89. 89. Id. at 762. 
90. Id. (citing REST. (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 404 cmt. b (1987)) (em-
phasis added). But what a difference ten years makes. At no point in Kiobel did Justice 
Breyer, in his concurrence, or Justice Roberts, in his majority opinion, identify the un-
derlying offenses as of universal concern (despite that they included torture) to say the 
least warranting of ATS jurisdiction, indicating that such a claim must do more for 
jurisdiction under the ATS. Perhaps an allegation of direct liability against a natural 
person would suffice. 
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against a spate of corporate actors and others for allegedly aiding and abet-
ting the South African apartheid regime, resulting in the torture and extraju-
dicial killing of South Africans.9' In a letter to the court, Mr. Mbeki made it 
very clear that South Africa, as a sovereign State, had a right to determine 
the resolution of claims resulting from its apartheid era in a way and place 
that it saw fit.92 That way was the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 
and that place South Africa. Notably, this letter gives no quarter to univer-
sal jurisdiction as generally conceived at international law. Numerous other 
States have expressed their opposition to the exercise of universal civil ju-
risdiction in the United States. Australia, Germany, the Netherlands, and the 
United Kingdom regularly oppose such jurisdiction when exercised in ATS 
93cases. 
However, comity was, in fact, the reason that Congress passed the 
ATS, 94 and it might require the exercise rather than the rejection of jurisdic-
tion.95 Indeed, some foreign sovereigns have so requested. In Sarei v. Rio 
Tinto, a foreign-cubed matter which concerned allegations of aiding and 
abetting torture, the Papua New Guinea Government assented to the exer-
cise of ATS jurisdiction 96 after first contesting it.9 The Bolivian Govern-
ment behaved similarly in Mamani v. Berzain, another foreign-cubed case, 
concerning alleged extrajudicial killings committed by former Bolivian 
government officials against political protestors.98 Courts should not, then, 
assume comity issues in ATS cases, even those with foreign-cubed claims. 99 
91. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat. Bank, 504 F.3d 254, 299 (2d Cir. 2007). 
92. Id. 
93. Brief of the Governments of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither 
Party, Kiobel, 569 U.S. 108 (No. 10-1491); Brief of the Federal Republic of Germany 
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, 569 U.S. 108 (No. 10-1491); Brief of the 
Governments of the United Kingdom and Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
Commonwealth of Australia as Amici Curiae in Support of Defendants-Appellees/ 
Cross-Appellants, Rio Tinto v. Sarei, 569 U.S. 945 (2013) (Nos. 09-56381, 02-56256, 
02-56390). 
94. See discussion infra at 15-16. 
95. 95. See Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1435 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
96. Sarei, 671 F.3d at 757 (judgment vacated by Rio Tinto v. Sarei, 569 U.S. 945 
(2013)). 
97. Id. 
98. Mamani v. Berzain, 21 F. Supp. 3d 1353, 1367 (S.D. Fla. 2014). 
99. In two foreign-squared cases, with overwhelmingly foreign features, the State 
where the direct injury occurred also consented to the exercise of ATS jurisdiction. The 
South African government of Joseph Zuma, who assumed the presidency immediately 
after Thabo Mbeki, consented to ATS jurisdiction in the expansive apartheid litigation 
in the United States. Brief for the United States Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees, at 
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The exercise of ATS jurisdiction over claims of direct violation of a 
jus cogens norm against a natural person should further alleviate comity 
issues because the alleged offense is severe, the connection between that 
offense and the alleged offender is close, and the offense is upon each State. 
Moreover, the State where the relevant conduct literally occurred might 
identify less with a defendant that is not a corporation' 00 and thus inter-
twined with the business of the State. 
Some scholars believe that in Kiobel the Supreme Court abolished uni-
versal civil jurisdiction in United States courts and that it did so out of 
comity concerns.o'0 This article contends that courts should not read Kiobel 
as having this effect on all universal claims nor opine that all ATS claims 
raise forbidding foreign relations issues. Neither in Kiobel nor in RJR 
Nabisco did the Court per se prohibit foreign-cubed cases where the plain-
tiff alleges direct liability for ajus cogens violation against a natural person. 
Moreover, this article suggests that the seriousness of the jus cogens claim, 
its implications at international law, and reduced comity risk warrant an 
express dictate from the Court if it deems these claims beyond the reach of 
the ATS. Without this clarity, lower courts should not deny ATS jurisdic-
tion on the ground that the relevant conduct giving rise to the jus cogens 
violation did not occur in the territorial United States. The courts should, in 
essence, treat these cases the way some courts did before Kiobel; they 
should, when appropriate, allow the exercise of universal civil jurisdiction. 
1I. PRE-KOBEL CASES 
The ATS was enacted in 1789, as a part of the First Judiciary Act of 
the United States Congress,1 02 to protect foreign relations and to hold to 
account the "enemy of all mankind," the pirate, and anyone who would 
harbor him.1 03 As others have observed, the statute "lay dormant" for 
¶ 3, Balintulo v. DaimlerAG, 727 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2013), (Nos. 09-2778-cv, 09-2779-
cv, 09-2780-cv, 09-2781-cv, 09-2783-cv, 09-2785-cv, 09-2787-cv, 09-2792-cv, 09-
2801-cv, 09-3037-cv.) (Germany, the home State of some of the defendants in this case, 
continued to oppose the exercise of ATS jurisdiction.) Likewise, the Ecuadorian gov-
ernment also consented to ATS jurisdiction in Jota v. Texaco Inc., which concerned 
allegations of environmental degradation and related personal injuries by Texaco in 
Ecuador. 157 F.3d 153, 158 (2d Cir. 1998). 
100. This is not at all to say that corporations should not be subject to ATS 
jurisdiction. 
101. See discussion infra at 21-22. 
102. 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
103. Id. This statute was spawned, in part, by congressional concern over the pos-
sible inability of the United States to provide legal redress to a French ambassador who 
was assaulted on United States soil and a Dutch ambassador whose domestic servant 
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05 roughly 200 years 04 until it was resuscitated by Filartiga. The first case 
of its kind, Filartigaaccomplished two key things. It clarified that torture is 
a violation of customary international law 06 and suggested the correctness 
of recognizing ATS jurisdiction despite that he parties were foreign and the 
signal event occurred in a foreign State. 07 (Indeed, the FilartigaCourt held 
that "deliberate torture perpetrated under color of official authority violates 
universally accepted norms of the international law of human rights, re-
gardlessof the nationalityof the parties"0 and that "whenever an alleged 
torturer is found and served with process by an alien within our borders, 
Section 1350 provides federal jurisdiction.").09 
Before Kiobel it was not uncommon for plaintiffs, like those in Filar-
tiga, to seek ATS jurisdiction premised on direct liability claims against 
natural persons. These claims were generally foreign-cubed, with little to no 
connection to the territory of the United States. Frequently, they also con-
cerned ajus cogens violation. Given the severity of the claim and the model 
created by Filartiga,courts were wont to recognize ATS jurisdiction. In 
Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, for example, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Eleventh Circuit upheld the recognition of ATS jurisdiction"t0 where the 
plaintiff, an Ethiopian national, alleged that an Ethiopian government offi-
cial "tortured and interrogated [her] for several hours.""' The plaintiff fur-
ther alleged that this official supervised and "participated directly""1 2 in 
some of the torture, which included whipping her on her legs and back 
while she was naked and bound.113 Additionally, she alleged that all of 
these events occurred in Ethiopia. 114 
was arrested after a New York official, without privilege, entered the ambassador's 
home in the United States. As a result of these specific incidents the statute was princi-
pally concerned, at its creation, with infringements on the rights of ambassadors and 
violations of safe conduct, as well as piracy, a signal challenge of the day. 
104. Doug Cassel, Suing Americans for Human Rights Torts Overseas: The Su-
preme Court Leaves the Door Open, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1773, 1774 (2014); see 
also Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, Two Myths About the Alien Tort Statute, 
89 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1609, 1637 (2014). 
105. Filartiga,630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
106. Id. at 884. 
107. Id. at 878. 
108. Id. (emphasis added). 
109. Id. 
110. Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d at 846. 
111. Id. at 845. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. at 845-46. 
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Similarly, in Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of Georgia also recognized jurisdiction where the 
plaintiffs, Bosnia-Herzegovina nationals, sued a soldier in the Bosnian Serb 
Army, alleging that the soldier tortured them while they were detained, 
without charge, at a police station in Bosanski Samac." 5 The court noted 
that "[the plaintiff] was beaten with batons and then with a baseball bat ... 
forced to spread his legs and . . . beaten on his genitals."116 Additionally, the 
court observed that the defendant kicked the plaintiff in the face, disfiguring 
him and "causing him to be unable to eat for 10 days."'"7 The court further 
concluded that ATS jurisdiction was proper because "official torture" vio-
lates customary international law." 8 As these two cases show, in this pre-
Kiobel era, courts were willing to recognize ATS jurisdiction over foreign-
cubed claims against a natural person alleging direct liability for a jus 
cogens violation. 
During this time, courts were also willing to recognize ATS jurisdic-
tion over a claim that alleged indirect liability for ajus cogens breach, such 
as torture. In In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litigation, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit deemed ATS jurisdiction ap-
propriate where the plaintiffs sued the estate of former President of the Phil-
ippines, Ferdinand Marcos, and his daughter, Imee Marcos-Manotec, for 
aiding and abetting the torture and wrongful death of a Philippine na-
tional.11 9 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants engaged in this conduct 
in the Philippines, "pursuant to martial law declared by Marcos."1 20 In 
reaching its decision the court opined that "the prohibition against official 
torture 'carries with it the force of ajus cogens norm,' which 'enjoy[s] the 
highest status within international law.' "121 
Similarly, in another suit against the estate of former President 
Marcos, the Ninth Circuit again concluded that ATS jurisdiction was proper 
115. Mehinovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d at 1331-32. 
116. Id. at 1333. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 1344-45. 
119. In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 495, 503 (9th Cir. 
1992). 
120. Id. at 496. 
121. Id. at 500 (quoting Siderman, 965 F.2d at 715) (internal citation omitted). 
Siderman is a seminal case on the formation and authority of jus cogens norms. Its 
discussion about the hierarchy of these norms demonstrates some of the decision's ped-
agogical value: "[T]he supremacy of jus cogens extends over all rules of international 
law; norms that have attained the status of jus cogens 'prevail over and invalidate inter-
national agreements and other rules of international law in conflict with them.'" 
Siderman, 965 F.2d at 716 (quoting REST. (THIRD) FOREIGN REL. § 102 cmt. k (1987)). 
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where the plaintiffs alleged aiding and abetting liability for torture.1 22 In 
reaching its conclusion the court observed that during the Marcos adminis-
tration "up to 10,000 people in the Philippines were allegedly tortured, sum-
marily executed or disappeared at the hands of military intelligence 
personnel acting pursuant to martial law declared by Marcos." 2 3 
Also, in Xuncax v. Gramajo, the United States District Court for the 
District of Massachusetts recognized ATS jurisdiction1 2 4 where nine Guate-
malan nationals sued a former official of the Guatemalan government for 
aiding and abetting torture, summary execution and forced disappearance, 
amongst other claims.1 2 5 The plaintiffs alleged that all of the subject acts 
occurred in Guatemala.1 26 In reaching its decision the court noted the signif-
icance of Filartigaand non-derogable norms, stating that the ATS is de-
signed to address acts "perpetrated by hostis humani generis ('enemies of 
all mankind') in contravention of jus cogens (peremptory norms of interna-
tional law)." 2 7 
Finally, in Paul v. Avril, a magistrate for the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of Florida recognized ATS jurisdiction 
where six Haitian nationals sued another Haitian national, a military leader, 
for events that occurred in Haiti.1 28 The plaintiffs alleged aiding and abet-
ting liability for torture, amongst other acts-including dragging, beating, 
withholding medical treatment, and starvation-that occurred in Haiti.1 29 
They specifically alleged that they were subject to these acts upon defen-
dant's "order, approval, instigation, and knowledge" 30 and that "[n]one of 
the acts enunciated are alleged to have been committed by [the defendant] 
himself."'31 
In each of these cases, the courts cited to Filartiga,in some way, when 
analyzing the soundness of ATS jurisdiction. This seminal case's impact on 
early ATS cases, particularly those that alleged a jus cogens violation, was 
profound. This article suggests the continued viability of this pioneering 
case, despite the recent narrowing of ATS jurisdiction, because neither Ki-
122. In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 
1994). 
123. Id. at 1469. 
124. See Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 189. 
125. Id. at 169-71. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. at 183. 
128. Paul v. Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207, 209 (S.D. Fla. 1993). 
129. Id. at 209. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. 
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obel nor RJR Nabisco reach claims of direct liability for ajus cogens viola-
tion against a natural person, the prototypical Filartiga-typeclaim. 
III. KIOBEL 
Kiobel, like most other ATS cases against a corporation, concerned an 
allegation of indirect liability for a jus cogens violation.1 3 2 The plaintiffs, 
residents of Nigeria's Ogoniland, alleged that Royal Dutch Petroleum Com-
pany, Shell Transport and Trading Company, and Shell Petroleum Develop-
ment Company of Nigeria (collectively "Shell"), aided and abetted the 
Nigerian government in committing torture, amongst other atrocities, 
against them.1 33 The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the case by 
the Second Circuit, concluding that no conduct relevant to the ATS claim 
occurred in the United States.1 3 4 It specifically stated: 
On these facts, all the relevant conduct took place outside the United 
States. And even where the claims touch and concern the territory of 
the United States, they must do so with sufficient force to displace 
the presumption against extraterritorial application. Corporations are 
often present in many countries, and it would reach too far to say that 
mere corporate presence suffices. If Congress were to determine oth-
erwise, a statute more specific than the ATS would be required.' 35 
In reaching this decision the Court did not seem to consider the signifi-
cance of a claim alleging indirect versus direct liability, a claim alleging a 
tort against a juridical versus a natural person, or a claim alleging a viola-
tion of a non-peremptory versus a peremptory or jus cogens norm.136 
The Court seemed to consider only the character of the claim before 
it-the foreign-cubed claim-with little to no connection to the United 
States, alleging the aiding and abetting of a law of nations violation (includ-
ing jus cogens) against a corporation. Pursuant to Kiobel, such a claim, it 
appears, cannot sustain ATS jurisdiction.3 7 Both the Court's holding and 
Justice Breyer's concurring opinion reveal the justices' focus on the scope 
of the ATS when applied to corporatedefendants. As noted, at the end of 
132. See generally Kiobel, 569 U.S. 108. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. at 124. The Second Circuit, however, dismissed the case on the ground 
that the ATS does not confer jurisdiction over corporations. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum, 621 F.3d 111, 149 (2d Cir. 2010), aff'd, 569 U.S. 108 (2013). Jesner, of 
course, affirms the view that the ATS does not confer jurisdiction over foreign corpora-
tions. See 138 S. Ct. at 1407. 
135. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 125 (citing Morrison, 561 U.S. at 264-73). 
136. See generally Kiobel, 569 U.S. 108. 
137. Id. at 125. 
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the opinion, after providing the touch and concern language, the Court 
stated, "Corporations are often present in many countries, and it would 
reach too far to say that mere corporate presence suffices [to rebut the pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality]. 
If Congress were to determine otherwise, a statute more specific than 
the ATS would be required." 3 8 That these are the last words of the opin-
ion,1 39 rather than some broader, more abstract, or theoretical language 
about the definitive reach of the ATS, furthers the notion that the Kiobel 
holding was largely about the instant facts before the Court-regarding the 
extraterritorial reach of the statute when corporations are sued pursuant to 
ATS jurisdiction-and little more.1 4 0 (That is not in the least to say that to 
the Court the question of United States nexus would be immaterial when 
the defendant is a natural person). 
Because of the specific facts in Kiobel and the Court's fact-specific 
holding, it is unclear whether the holding precludes ATS jurisdiction over a 
foreign-cubed claim alleging the aiding and abetting of a law of nations 
violation (whether of a jus cogens norm or not) against a natural person. 
The appropriate effect of Kiobel on this kind of claim is not apparent be-
cause the only difference between this claim and the kind of claim brought 
in Kiobel is the type of defendant. That said, the Kiobel holding signifi-
cantly focuses on corporations. Consequently, the difference in type of de-
fendant may be a dispositive one. It seems far clearer, though, that Kiobel 
did not preclude ATS jurisdiction over the foreign-cubed claim where the 
plaintiff alleges direct liability for a jus cogens violation against a natural 
person. 
In Kiobel, the plaintiffs, Nigerian nationals, alleged that Shell should 
be held liable for torture and crimes against humanity, amongst other 
claims, because it "provid[ed]the Nigerian forces with food, transportation, 
and compensation, as well as . . . allow[ed] the Nigerian military to use 
[Shell's] property as a staging ground for attacks."l 4 1In virtually every way 
the Court seemed compelled by the notion of distance in these facts: (1) 
138. Id. 
139. Id. 
140. Some of Justice Breyer's language reinforces the conclusion that the Kiobel 
holding principally concerned corporate defendants. He stated: 
Under these circumstances, even if the New York office were a sufficient basis for 
asserting general jurisdiction . . . it would be farfetched to believe, based solely 
upon the defendants' minimal and indirect American presence, that this legal ac-
tion helps to vindicate a distinct American interest, such as in not providing a safe 
harbor for an "enemy of all mankind." 
Id. at 140 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment) (citations omitted). 
141. Id. at 113-114 (emphasis added). 
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distance of the defendants to the plaintiffs' harm; (2) distance of the plain-
tiffs' injury to the forum State; and (3) distance of the plaintiffs themselves 
to the forum. These features, arguably, would not be present with the claim 
of direct liability for a jus cogens violation against a natural person. 
First, because the plaintiff would be alleging direct liability for the 
violation, there would be no distance between the defendant and the plain-
tiff's harm. Second, because the alleged harm would be ajus cogens viola-
tion, it would be considered an offense against every State. 14 2 Third, 
because the alleged harm would be a jus cogens violation, every State has 
an interest in prosecuting the perpetrator regardless of the nationality of the 
plaintiff. Moreover, as shown, pre-Kiobel, an allegation of ajus cogens vio-
lation, for some courts, was a legal show-stopper given that such an offense 
is considered among the most egregious known to humankind and that, as 
such, international law authorizes every State to confer jurisdiction-indis-
putably criminal and theoretically civill 4 3 -over the alleged offender. Ac-
cordingly, there is nothing in Kiobel that should prevent this result today 
when the claim alleges direct liability against a natural person for a jus 
cogens violation.144 Kiobel simply did not speak to these allegations. Re-
gardless, these allegations, by definition, touch and concern every State 
given the nature of the jus cogens norm and the significance of its breach at 
international law.1 45 Many courts, however, have concluded that the Kiobel 
holding commands one outcome if the claim at issue is foreign-cubed, re-
gardless of any different treatment warranted by the class of the defendant, 
the type of harm, or the nature of the liability. (In his Kiobel concurrence, 
Justice Breyer noted the relevance of the distinction between the categories 
of liability when concluding that the facts of Kiobel were insufficient for a 
finding of ATS jurisdiction, observing that "the plaintiffs allege, not that the 
defendants directly engaged in acts of torture, genocide, or the equivalent, 
but that they helped others . . . to do so.").146 
142. Siderman, 965 F.2d at 715 ("In the words of the International Court of Jus-
tice, these norms, which include 'principles and rules concerning the basic human rights 
of the human person,' are the concern of all states; 'they are obligations erga omnes.'") 
(quoting The Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belgium v. Spain), Judgment, 
1970 I.C.J. Rep. 3, 32 (Feb. 5)). 
143. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 240. 
144. This argument also likely applies to the juridical person defendant. 
145. See Colangelo, supra note 74, at 1327 ("Indeed . . . the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction is not really extraterritorial; rather, it is the decentralized enforcement by 
domestic courts of an international law that covers the globe.") (citation omitted). 
146. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 140 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment). 
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IV. POST-KIOBEL CASES 
After Kiobel was decided many scholars pronounced the death of uni-
versal jurisdiction pursuant to the ATS. Professor Wallach stated that the 
case "brought to an end the thirty-year experiment lower federal courts had 
been conducting with universal civil jurisdiction under the ATS"1 4 7 and that 
"Kiobel leaves no doubt that courts cannot apply federal law to claims 
under the ATS unless there is a sufficiently strong connection between the 
United States and the conduct forming the basis for the alleged torts." 4 8 
Similarly, Professor Ku asserted that "both the opinion for the Court by 
Chief Justice John Roberts and the main concurring opinion by Justice Ste-
phen Breyer refused to interpret the ATS as authorizing universal jurisdic-
tion." 4 9 Additionally, Professor Altholtz said that "[i]n Kiobel, the Supreme 
Court majority rejected [the idea that the ATS provided universal jurisdic-
tion] and narrowed U.S. court jurisdiction to suits that 'touch and concern' 
U.S. interests."o5 0 Professor Kontorovich also suggested that the "retrench-
ment"15' reflected in Kiobel was predictable given international law 
trends 52 and opined that "Kiobel is the next major step in a broad disen-
gagement from [universal jurisdiction] by leading Western nations." 53 
However, others considered where the ATS might still have capacity 
to vindicate human rights abuses. Professor Stephens asserted that Justice 
Breyer's opinion-offering various ways that an ATS claim could touch 
and concern the United States-might suggest a way "forward." 54 She also 
observed that "[t]he Supreme Court's narrow holding in Kiobel should not 
bar claims against U.S. corporations or claims against foreign corporations 
147. 147. David Wallach, The Irrationality of Universal Civil Jurisdiction, 46 
GEO. J. INT'L L. 803, 828 (2015). 
148. Id. 
149. Julian G. Ku, Kiobel and the Surprising Death of Universal Jurisdiction 
Under the Alien Tort Statute, 107 AM. J. INT'L L. 835, 835 (2013). 
150. Roxana Altholz, Chronicle of a Death Foretold: The Futureof U.S. Human 
Rights Litigation Post-Kiobel, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1495, 1498 (2014). 
151. Eugene Kontorovich, Kiobel Surprise: Unexpected by Scholars but Consis-
tent with InternationalTrends, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1671, 1673 (2014). 
152. Id. (observing that "[u]niversal jurisdiction, which had seemed an ascendant 
law doctrine in the 1990s, has in the past decade encountered a significant backlash, 
leading ultimately to its destabilization and retrenchment"). 
153. Id. 
154. Beth Stephens, The Curious History of the Alien Tort Statute, 89 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1467, 1541 (2014) ("Viewed as an elaboration of the issues raised by 
Justice Kennedy, Justice Breyer's concurring opinion could inform application of a 
Sosa-Kiobel ATS standard going forward."). 
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with substantial ties to the United States."15 Additionally, Professors Cur-
ran and Sloss proposed legislation to resolve the issues posed by ATS juris-
diction but also to provide access to a remedy for those who need the 
jurisdiction most.1 56 
The debate about the reach of the statute continues. In its midst are 
courts strictly circumscribing this reach. Few of those courts consider the 
significance of ATS jurisdiction premised on allegations of direct liability 
for ajus cogens violation against a natural person. Many dismiss forthwith 
ATS claims with these features, according them no legal value whatsoever. 
Quite the contrary, to a substantial degree, the cases post-Kiobel (and post-
RJR Nabisco) demonstrate that many courts are applying a test to ATS 
claims that facially precludes appropriate consideration of Filartiga-type 
claims. When confronted with the question of ATS propriety, these courts 
apply Kiobel's touch and concern test. In the doing, they determine whether 
any relevant conduct 57 occurred in the territorial United States. If it did, 
they allow ATS jurisdiction. If it did not, they disallow it. Many courts take 
this approach-privileging territoriality-without any express requirement 
in Kiobel to do so. These courts do not consider liability, defendant, nor 
norm differentials. 
In Warfaa v. Ali, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit provides the paradigmatic example of a court's improvident dismis-
sal of an ATS claim pursuant to the theory that relevant conduct must occur 
in the territorial United States to sustain ATS jurisdiction.158 A foreign-cu-
bed case, Warfaa concerned an allegation of direct liability for torture 
against a natural person. Indeed, the plaintiff and the defendant were Somali 
nationals and the events that gave rise to the plaintiff's injury occurred in 
Somalia.1 5 9 The court, thus, affirmed the district court's dismissal of this 
claim on the ground that the claim did not "touch[] and concern[ ]" the 
United States sufficient to rebut the presumption against 
extraterritoriality.1 60 
155. Beth Stephens, Extraterritorialityand Human Rights After Kiobel, 28 MD. J. 
INT'L L. 256, 274 (2013). 
156. Vivian Grosswald Curran & David Sloss, Reviving Human Rights Litigation 
After Kiobel, 107 AM. J. INT'L L. 858, 862 (2013) ("We propose a statutory private right 
of action to enable genocide victims to file civil tort actions against any perpetrators 
whom prosecutors have charged with genocide or related offenses."). 
157. Many courts have determined the presence or absence of relevant conduct 
without inquiry into the focus of the ATS. Other courts have attempted to define the 
focus as safely and predictably as possible. 
158. Warfaa v. Ali, 811 F.3d 653, 661 (4th Cir. 2016). 
159. Id. at 656. 
160. Id. at 661. 
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The court reflexively applied Kiobel in reaching this conclusion.161 In 
the process, it used a version of the touch and concern test not articulated by 
the Supreme Court in Kiobel. The court stated that "[a] plaintiff may rebut 
the presumption in certain narrow circumstances: when extensive United 
States contacts are present and the alleged conduct bears such a strong and 
direct connection to the United States that it falls within Kiobel's limited 
'touch and concern language.' "162 In Kiobel the Supreme Court never spoke 
of "contacts" when speaking about this test. The use of that word suggests 
that the Court requires an actual, literal, physical connection to the United 
States for the test to be met. If this is what the Court meant, it did not say it 
in Kiobel (Admittedly, there is now a stronger argument to make that RJR 
Nabisco requires this test but this article still contends otherwise.). The sig-
nificance of the Fourth Circuit's misunderstanding of the touch and concern 
test is that this misapprehension prevented the court from seeing other ways 
that the claim implicated the United States. 
As discussed above, a jus cogens violation affects every State. The 
Warfaa Court, though, failed to consider the significance of the jus cogens 
claim before it. The plaintiff sought ATS jurisdiction pursuant to his allega-
tion of a direct commission of such a violation.'63 To wit, the plaintiff al-
leged that an officer in the Somali government, along with others, tortured 
him by beating him multiple times,'1" shooting him in the wrist and leg,1 65 
and then leaving him for dead.' 66 That the alleged torture occurred in 
Somalia 67 should not have resulted in summary dismissal of his ATS claim 
given that ajus cogens violation anywhere is as good as ajus cogens viola-
tion everywhere. That is the nature of the tort. Accordingly, the court 
should have considered the import of the plaintiff's jus cogens claim within 
the context of the plaintiff's request for ATS jurisdiction.1 6 8 The court 
161. Id. at 662-63 (Gregory, J., dissenting). The dissent, however, correctly ob-
served that the instant case was distinguishable from Kiobel because there was a safe 
harbor issue and the matter concerned a natural person and not a corporation. It addi-
tionally noted that "[b]lithely relying on the fact that the human rights abuses occurred 
abroad ignores the myriad ways in which this claim touches and concerns the territory 
of the United States." Id. at 663. 
162. Id. at 660 (emphasis added). 
163. Id. at 656-57. As well, the court did not consider prevention of safe harbor as 
one of the bases for recognizing ATS jurisdiction. 
164. Id. at 656. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. at 660-61. 
168. See also id. at 662 (Gregory, J., dissenting) (observing that "no circuit court 
has decided a post-Kiobel ATS case premised on principal liability brought against an 
individual defendant who has sought safe haven in the United States, a key difference 
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should have also considered the implications of the plaintiff's allegation of 
direct (rather than indirect) liability against a natural (rather than juridical) 
person. 
Similarly, in Jara v. Nunez, the United States District Court for the 
Middle District of Florida dismissed the plaintiffs' claims on the ground 
that all of the relevant conduct occurred abroad. 169 There, the plaintiff sued 
a member of General Augusto Pinochet's army for torture and extrajudicial 
killing.1 70 According to the complaint, "Defendant ordered his subordinates 
to torture [the plaintiff's decedent] and then 'personallysubjected [him] to 
the game of Russian roulette, putting [him] in fear of his life' and ultimately 
killing him."1 71 The decedent and the defendant were Chilean nationals 72 
and the shooting occurred in Chile.1 73 The court did not consider the signifi-
cance of the plaintiff's claim of direct liability against a natural person for a 
jus cogens violation. 
Likewise, in Sikhs for Justice v. Nath, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the claim brought 
pursuant to the ATS because all of the relevant conduct occurred over-
seas.1 74 There, the plaintiffs, Indian nationals, alleged that another Indian 
national, amongst others, committed grave human rights abuses against 
them, all in the territory of India.' 75 The court agreed with the rejection of 
ATS jurisdiction despite the plaintiffs' claim of direct liability for a jus 
cogens violation.1 76 
the majority does not address" and that "the analysis and relevant considerations may 
differ where the defendant is a natural person"). 
169. Jara v. Nunez, No. 6:13-cv-1426-Orl-378GJK, 2015 WL 12852354, at *4, 
(M.D. Fla. April 14, 2015) ("Kiobel forecloses all of Plaintiffs' ATS claims because the 
tortious conduct took place entirely outside the United States. Though Kiobel provides 
for some possible extraterritorial application of the ATS, the wholly foreign conduct 
here . . . simply does not 'touch and concern' the United States with such force as to 
overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality.") (citations omitted). 
170. Id. 
171. Id. at *2 (emphasis in original). 
172. Id. at *3-*4. However, by the time that the court decided the question of ATS 
jurisdiction, the defendant was a United States citizen. 
173. Id. at *4. 
174. Sikhs for Just. Inc. v. Nath, 596 Fed. Appx. 7, 9 (2d Cir. 2014). 
175. See generally Sikhs for Just. Inc., 596 Fed. Appx. 7. 
176. Id. at 9. Additionally, in Fotso v. Cameroon, No. 6:12 CV 1415-TC. 2013 
WL 3006338, *7, (D. Or. June 11, 2013), the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Oregon, dismissed a plaintiffs torture claim against a public official, brought 
pursuant to the ATS. The parties were all Cameroon nationals and the underlying con-
duct occurred in Cameroon. However, the plaintiff alleged a direct jus cogens offense 
against a natural person. This notwithstanding, the court dismissed the matter with great 
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These cases show that, when resolving the question of ATS jurisdic-
tion, some courts do not consider the import of claims that allege a jus 
cogens violation, direct liability, or a natural person offender. Four years 
after deciding Kiobel, the Court decided RJR Nabisco, which, among other 
things, regarded the general approach that a court should follow when con-
sidering the extraterritorial application of a statute.1 77 The decision, how-
ever, offers little, if anything, to clarify the substantive and geographic 
reach of the ATS. 
V. RJR NABISCO 
The European Community (EC) sued RJR Nabisco, in a United States 
court, under the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 
on the ground that the company had engaged in a complex money launder-
ing scheme involving cigarette sales in the European Union (EU). 78 The 
EC sought to apply RICO to alleged conduct that occurred in the EU.1 79 In 
determining whether the statute applied extraterritorially, the United States 
Supreme Court concluded that it must apply the following two-step 
framework: 
At the first step, we ask whether the presumption against extraterrito-
riality has been rebutted-that is, whether the statute gives a clear, 
affirmative indication that it applies extraterritorially. We must ask 
this question regardless of whether the statute in question regulates 
conduct, affords relief, or merely confers jurisdiction. If the statute is 
not extraterritorial, then at the second step we determine whether the 
case involves a domestic application of the statute, and we do this by 
looking to the statute's "focus." If the conduct relevant to the stat-
ute's focus occurred in the United States, then the case involves a 
permissible domestic application even if other conduct occurred 
abroad; but if the conduct relevant to the focus occurred in a foreign 
country, then the case involves an impermissible extraterritorial ap-
plication regardless of any other conduct that occurred in U.S. 
territory. 8 0 
The Court cited its holding in Kiobel when it enunciated this 
scheme.' 8' The significance of the framework to ATS cases, however, is 
dispatch, noting that the presumption against extraterritoriality applied and that 
"[a]ccordingly, plaintiff concedes his claims against the individual defendants." 
177. RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2090. 
178. Id. at 2098. 
179. Id. at 2097-98. 
180. Id. at 2101. 
181. Id. 
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unclear but potentially substantial. Kiobel disposed of any ambiguity re-
garding whether the plain language of the statute evidences congressional 
intent that it apply extraterritorially. 18 2 According to the Court, it does not. 
So, the issue for ATS claims is not Step 1 but rather Step 2-and Step 2 
offers little to direct the court seized with a claim brought pursuant to the 
statute. Because the Supreme Court has yet to identify the "focus" of the 
ATS or the requisite character, kind, and quantum of conduct that is rele-
vant to that focus, the language in Step 2 suggests nothing regarding the 
conduct that might pass jurisdictional muster. Moreover, Step 2 is subject to 
more than one interpretation. It might mean that ATS jurisdiction is proper 
if relevant conduct occurred in the United States and nowhere else; or, that 
ATS jurisdiction is proper if relevant conduct occurred in the United States 
despite that it might have also occurred in a foreign State; or, ATS jurisdic-
tion is not proper if relevant conduct occurred in a foreign State even if 
relevant conduct also occurred in the United States. Further, it is anyone's 
guess what any of these interpretations mean to the foreign-cubed jus 
cogens claim alleging direct liability against a natural person. 
There are additional key questions about the reach of the ATS that 
neither Kiobel nor RJR Nabisco answer. Both Justice Kennedy's and Justice 
Breyer's concurrences in Kiobel speak to the possibility of ATS jurisdiction 
being appropriate under circumstances not considered by the Court in the 
majority opinion. Importantly, their opinions suggest that the emphasis that 
the Kiobel majority opinion placed on relevant conduct in the United States 
might not be appropriate for all ATS cases. In his concurrence, Justice Ken-
nedy observed that the Court left "open a number of significant questions 
regarding the reach and interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute"1 83 and that 
"[o]ther cases may arise with allegations of serious violations of interna-
tional law principles protecting persons, cases [not] covered . . . by the 
reasoning and holding of today's case."1 84 He further opined that in those 
cases "the proper implementation of the presumption against extraterritorial 
application may require some further elaboration and explanation." 8 5 Simi-
larly, in his concurrence, Justice Breyer stated that the Kiobel opinion did 
not answer the requisite question of precisely when the ATS can be applied 
extraterritorially and that, instead, "[i]t leaves for another day the determi-
nation of just when the presumption against extraterritoriality might be 
'overcome. '"186 
182. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 117. 
183. Id. at 125 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
184. Id. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. at 131-32. 
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Justice Kennedy, however, joined the majority opinion in RJR 
Nabisco. Given his observations in Kiobel, revealing an understanding 
about the nuances in ATS cases, it is difficult to see how he would agree to 
a reading of the ATS that would completely bar jurisdiction unless relevant 
conduct occurred in the territorial United States, as one reading of the two-
step framework would require.18 7 Perhaps more plausible is that Justice 
Kennedy does not read Step 2 in the RJR Nabisco framework as strictly as 
others might.188 More specifically, Justice Kennedy's presence in the RJR 
Nabisco Majority might mean that the Court did not intend for Step 2 to 
preclude jurisdiction over every claim brought pursuant to the ATS that 
lacks relevant conduct in the territorial United States. 
This article suggests that neither Kiobel nor RJR Nabisco strictly fore-
close ATS jurisdiction premised on direct liability of a natural person for a 
jus cogens claim. However, if courts read Step 2 to require relevant conduct 
in the territorial United States, then Step 2 will foreclose this kind of claim. 
VI. POST-RJR NABISCO CASES 
Because RJR Nabisco was fairly recently decided, very few commen-
tators to date have published about its significance to ATS cases. In one of 
the few works that engage this question, Professor Swaine underscores that 
RJR Nabisco evidences the Court's increased focus on "territoriality"-as 
opposed to extraterritoriality-when determining the reach of a U.S. stat-
ute.' 89 Similarly, in his work, Professor Gevurtz observes that, with RJR 
Nabisco, the Court made it more difficult to seek redress "under federal law 
for injuries suffered abroad." 90 Certainly these are facts about he case with 
which ATS plaintiffs must contend. 
187. See id. at 125 (Kennedy, J., concurring). His Kiobel concurrence was brief 
and somewhat cryptic so what, if anything, it, in fact, presaged is certainly subject to 
another interpretation. 
188. See, e.g., Adhikari, 845 F.3d 184. 
189. Edward T. Swaine, Kiobel and Extraterritoriality:Here, (Not) There, (Not 
Even) Everywhere, 69 OKLA. L. REV. 23, 25 (2016) ("Unsurprisingly, given its title, this 
Article puts a heavy emphasis on territoriality-not, it should be stressed, as a matter of 
normative preference, but purely as a reflection of the Court's recent cases. It is accord-
ingly inconsistent with some of the more expansive readings of the ATS, though it stops 
short of Justice Alito's prescription."). 
190. Franklin A. Gevurtz, Building A Wall Against PrivateActions for Overseas 
Injuries: The Impact of RJR Nabisco v. European Community, 23 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L 
L. & POL'Y 1, 2 (2016) ("In perhaps another skirmish between the forces of globaliza-
tion and those who want to fence the world out, Justice Alito in RJR Nabisco v. Euro-
pean Community . . . raised the presumption against extraterritoriality into a 
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In the two cases post-RJR Nabisco that, to date, deal substantively with 
the ATS, Adhikari v. Kellogg, Brown & Root,191 and Salim v. Mitchell,19 2 
the courts indeed privilege territoriality. In Adhikari,193 the plaintiffs alleged 
that the defendant was directly liable for forced labor and human trafficking 
in Iraq.1 94 There, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
applied RJR Nabisco's two-step framework. It opined that, at Step 2, "[i]f 
we conclude that the record is devoid of any domestic activity relevant to 
Plaintiffs' claims, our analysis is complete: as in Kiobel, the presumption 
95against extraterritoriality bars the action." But, as stated above, Step 2 of 
the framework lends itself to more than one reading and this court's is just 
one. Nonetheless, compelled by a strict interpretation of RJR Nabisco, the 
court looked for U.S.-based conduct that reached the level of "relevant" 
and, finding none,19 6 affirmed the district court's dismissal of the ATS 
claim (this, despite the defendant's status as a United States corporation). 
Although the court acknowledged that the plaintiffs alleged "direct liability 
for the tort of human trafficking and forced labor"' 97-which some authori-
ties view as jus cogens violations' 98-it accorded no legal significance to 
the heinousness of the alleged offenses or the alleged direct commission of 
them by the defendant. 
By contrast, the dissent observed that Step 2 of the framework "leaves 
open the questions of how to interpret the focus, and how courts should 
proceed when there is potentially relevant conduct both within and outside 
the United States." 99 The dissent also recognized the significance of "the 
nature of the defendant's liability (director indirect)200 as well as the signif-
substantially greater barrier against those seeking relief under federal law for injuries 
suffered abroad."). 
191. Adhikari, 845 F.3d 184. 
192. Salim, 268 F. Supp. 3d 1132 (2017). 
193. See generally Adhikari, 845 F.3d 184. 
194. Id. at 192. 
195. Id. at 195 (citing Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 108 (2013)). 
196. See generally Adhikari, 845 F.3d 184. 
197. Id. at 197. 
198. Adhikari v. Daoud & Partners,697 F. Supp. 2d 674, 686 (S.D. Tex. 2009) 
("It is apparent from the findings of both judicial and academic authorities, discussed 
later in this Memorandum and Order, that human trafficking and forced labor, whether 
committed by states or private individuals, have been recognized as violations of jus 
cogens norms, and therefore fall within the jurisdictional grant of the ATS."); Doe v. 
Unocal, 395 F.3d 932, 945 (9th Cir. 2002), on reh'g en banc sub nom. Doe v. Unocal, 
403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005) ("[F]orced labor is so widely condemned that it has 
achieved the status of a jus cogens violation."). 
199. Adhikari, 845 F.3d at 208 (Graves, J., dissenting). 
200. Id. (emphasis in original). 
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icance of the "type of violation alleged," 20 1 in determining the propriety of 
ATS jurisdiction. It deemed these inquiries vital, "above and beyond neces-
sary allegations of relevant conduct occurring in the United States." 202 
In Salim, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Washington, like the Fifth Circuit in Adhikari, focused on territoriality and 
recognized ATS jurisdiction in the matter before it. There, the court consid-
ered allegations of direct liability against natural persons for torture. The 
plaintiffs specifically alleged that defendants "designed, implemented, and 
personally administered an experimental torture program for the U.S. Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency," 203 which caused the plaintiffs' extreme injuries. 
The court concluded that he "focus test" did not apply but that, even if it 
did, the allegations would satisfy. 204 The court did apply Kiobel's touch and 
concern test, finding it met given that the defendants, two psychologists, 
were U.S. nationals and conducted much of their work on U.S. territory.205 
While each of these decisions concerned allegations of torture, neither 
meaningfully acknowledged that torture is ajus cogens violation. As a con-
sequence, neither determined the legal significance of this fact. Instead, the 
court in Adhikari considered the location of relevant conduct strictly, as 
many courts did after Kiobel, irrespective of the gravity of the inquiry con-
cerned, and, accordingly, did not deem ATS jurisdiction appropriate be-
cause no "relevant conduct" occurred in the territorial United States. The 
court in Salim deeply contemplated the seriousness of the claims of tor-
ture-albeit without evaluating them within the context of jus cogens. The 
court sustained ATS jurisdiction because the defendants were U.S. nationals 
and engaged in conduct on U.S. territory. Each of these courts, though, had 
an opportunity to discuss the significance of ajus cogens violation and the 
directness of the claim of liability and neither pursued it. 
VII. FOREIGN OFFICIAL IMMUNITY CASES 
There is a line of cases, however, that fully contemplates the allegation 
of a jus cogens violation. These cases hold that even an allegation of indi-
rect liability for this breach is so significant that it can strip a foreign offi-
20 1. Id. 
202. Id. 
203. Salim, 268 F. Supp. 3d at 1160. ("As to ATS jurisdiction, the legal landscape 
is evolving, but this court finds the touch and concern test of Kiobel and Doe I v. Nestle, 
766 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2014), to be the appropriate and controlling standard."). 
204. Id. at 1161 ("The court does not agree with the formulation of the 'focus 
test' as presented by the Fifth and Second Circuit cases . .. but if required to utilize the 
focus inquiry, the court would find it met."). 
205. See id. at 1153. 
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cial of prosecutorial immunity. In Yousuf v. Samantar, Somali nationals 
sued a former senior official of the Somali government for torture, extraju-
dicial killing, and other acts, and sought jurisdiction pursuant to the ATS. 20 6 
The plaintiffs alleged that they were subjected to the acts "by government 
agents under the command and control of [the defendant] ."207 They did not 
allege that the defendant directly committed these acts. The defendant con-
tended that he was protected by common law immunities 208 because any 
actions that formed the basis of the plaintiffs' claim "were taken in the 
course and scope of his official duties." 2 0 9 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit disagreed, 
concluding that "under international and domestic law, officials from other 
countries are not entitled to foreign official immunity for jus cogens viola-
tions, even if the acts were performed in the defendant's official capac-
ity." 2 10 The court's decision to deny immunity was led by the gravity of the 
alleged offense, irrespective of the foreign-cubedness of the claim or the 
indirectness of the liability. Accordingly, there would seem to be nothing 
about Kiobel or RJR Nabisco that would alter this case outcome. 
Similarly, in Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimah, the plaintiff, a Ghanaian na-
tional, sued a Ghanaian government official in the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of New York, seeking jurisdiction under the 
ATS. 2 1 1The plaintiff alleged that he was imprisoned for one year on suspi-
cion of planning a government overthrow and that, during that time, he was 
tortured while the defendant interrogated him. 2 1 2 Upon the defendant's mo-
tion to dismiss under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), the 
court opined that "the FSIA 'will not shield an official who acts beyond the 
scope of his authority,' " 2 13 and that "the alleged acts of torture committed 
by [the defendant] fall beyond the scope of his authority." 2 1 4 The court then 
206. Yousuf v. Samantar,699 F.3d 763, 766 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 571 U.S. 
1156 (Jan. 13, 2014). 
207. Id. 
208. Id. 
209. Id. at 767. 
210. Id. at 777. 
211. Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimal, 921 F. Supp. 1189 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
212. Id. at 1191. See Weatherall, supra note 74, at 1153 ("Although such conduct 
is often taken under 'color of law,' violations of jus cogens fall outside the official 
capacity of State officials and are consequently not attributable to the State, depriving 
that official of immunity rationemateriae [State immunity for official acts]."). 
213. Id. at 1197 (quoting Chuidianv. PhilippineNat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1106 
(9th Cir. 1990)). 
214. Id. at 1198. 
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determined that the plaintiff had jurisdiction pursuant to the ATS. 2 15 This 
rationale, again, should hold under existing Supreme Court precedent. 
Additionally, in In re Estate of Marcos, the Ninth Circuit held that 
foreign sovereign immunity would not shield the estate from jus cogens 
claims brought pursuant to the ATS. 2 16 The court deemed jus cogens viola-
tions beyond the scope of authority of a government official and accord-
ingly not protected by foreign sovereign immunity. 217 
Conversely, in Doganv. Barak, the court opted not to follow cases that 
denied immunity to a foreign official accused of a jus cogens violation, 
despite that it "agree[d] in principle that immunity doctrines should not 
shield persons who violate jus cogens norms." 2 18 The court was compelled 
by what it saw as the larger goal of preventing the "eviscerati[on] [of] the 
immunity of all foreign officials." 2 19 Despite this outcome, the court did 
evaluate the significance of the jus cogens claim,22 0 where the plaintiffs 
accused a former Israeli foreign minister of liability for causing torture and 
extrajudicial killing. 22 1 
To determine whether this official was entitled to immunity despite 
this allegation, the court performed a balancing test. It found that the need 
to protect the goal of immunity (e.g., disallowing suits over State conduct 
so that States are free to act) outweighed the need to protect the goal of the 
international law community (e.g., vindicate a bedrock norm designed to 
hold accountable those responsible for the gravest human rights abuses). 
The court's decision was aided substantially by a formal statement from the 
Israeli Government asserting that the defendant was acting within the scope 
of his duties when the subject events occurred 222 and a Suggestion of Immu-
nity from the United States Government, also supporting the defendant. 223 
The statement from the Israeli Government served to convince the court 
that the defendant was not at any relevant time engaged in ultra vires con-
duct, altogether challenging the plaintiffs' argument that the defendant's 
conduct violated an international norm. 
215. Id. 
216. Marcos, 25 F.3d at 1472. 
217. Id. 
218. Dogan v. Barak, No. 2:15 CV-08130-ODW(GSJx) 2016 WL 6024416 at *10 
(citing Yousuf, 699 F.3d at 775-77). 
219. Id. 
220. Id. 
221. See generally Dogan, 2016 WL 6024416. 
222. Id. at *Il. 
223. Id. at *10. The United States Government argued that the court should not 
recognize a jus cogens exception to foreign official immunity. 
77 2017-2018] The Whole Wide World 
Despite the differences between these decisions, all of them show that 
some courts, in some factual settings, pause to consider the significance of 
the jus cogens claim before them. In Yousuf, Cabiri, and In re Estate of 
Marcos, at least, the courts took the jus cogens claims so seriously that they 
deemed them preemptive of the defendants' immunity. When considering 
the propriety of ATS jurisdiction over claims of direct liability for a jus 
cogens violation against a natural person, courts should certainly evaluate 
the legal significance of that violation. International law demands this treat-
ment given that ajus cogens norm endeavors to protect individuals from the 
most heinous conduct; it reigns supreme over other international law norms, 
offends every State and requires every State's attention. Kiobel and RJR 
Nabisco do not command a different response. Neither case concerned these 
Filartiga-typefacts. Moreover, ajus cogens violation, because of its abhor-
rence and function at international law, touches and concerns every nation. 
Conduct that is relevant for one State should be relevant for another. 
The United States is, irrespective of Kiobel and RJR Nabisco, subject 
to international law. There is no opt-out option for any State from the cate-
gory of international law known as jus cogens. The question, though, is 
whether these two cases allow the vindication of this norm through the 
ATS. This article contends that hey do. 
VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The jus cogens norm is sui generis. Given the seriousness of its viola-
tion, as well as the guidance of Kiobel and RJR Nabisco, this article recom-
mends that when confronted with a request for ATS jurisdiction over a 
claim alleging direct liability for a jus cogens violation against a natural 
person, courts do the following 224 . 
(1) assume that the obvious is the focus of the ATS jurisdiction over 
a claim by a foreign national alleging a tort in violation of inter-
national law; 225 
(2) determine whether violation of the jus cogens norm in question 
falls within the focus; 
(3) if it does not, end the inquiry; 
(4) if it does, determine the conduct relevant to that focus; 
224. Focusing onjus cogens breaches imposes a limit on the kind and quantity of 
claims subject to the treatment proposed. 
225. See Adhikari, 845 F.3d at 197 ("[T]he focus is on conduct that violates inter-
national law, which the ATS seeks to regulate by giving federal courts jurisdiction over 
such claims."); Mustafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 185 (2d Cir. 2014) ("[T]he 
focus of the ATS is on conduct and the location of that conduct."). 
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(5) recognize that no territorial limit applies to conduct relevant to a 
jus cogens violation; 
(6) recognize that ajus cogens violation touches and concerns every 
State, including the United States; 
(6) consider the significance of an allegation of a direct violation of a 
jus cogens norm;226 
(8) consider the significance of such an allegation against a natural 
person; 227 and 
(9) consider comity concerns. 228 
Such an approach might add clarity to an opaque jurisdictional process 
and allow more detailed consideration of the kinds of claims that gave rise 
to the ATS in the first place, e.g., international law violations as heinous as 
piracy. 
CONCLUSION 
Neither Kiobel nor RJR Nabisco expressly prohibit a Filartiga-type 
claim and so, barring relevant Supreme Court or congressional action, 
courts should not reflexively dismiss these claims on the ground that no 
conduct relevant o the focus of the ATS occurred in the United States. In 
evaluating what remains of ATS jurisdiction after these two decisions, it is 
important to remember some key realities. There is nothing different about 
the ATS itself from Filartigato today. There is nothing different about the 
scope of the law of nations violations recognized under the statute. Like-
wise, there is nothing different about he meaning of ajus cogens violation. 
Finally, there is nothing in Kiobel and RJR Nabisco that expressly addresses 
Filartiga-typefacts, so the Filartiga-typeclaim should not necessarily be 
subject to the same fate as the Kiobel-type claim. 
Pre-Kiobelcourts were compelled by allegations of direct liability for 
ajus cogens violation. Despite Kiobel's and RJR Nabisco'scircumscription 
of some ATS claims, as noted above, that circumscription does not, ipso 
facto, preclude jurisdiction over all ATS claims. Given a claim of direct 
226. Perhaps such an allegation would suggest a degree of culpability that war-
rants immediate judicial attention. That is not at all to say that facts alleging aiding and 
abetting liability, particularly against a corporation, cannot be egregious and reflect a 
culpability as profound as the most heinous claim of direct liability for a jus cogens 
violation against a natural person. 
227. Perhaps such an allegation would allow the court to hold to account the very 
person responsible for committing the jus cogens violation. 
228. Perhaps there would be limited foreign affairs implications to an exercise of 
universal jurisdiction if the defendant is a natural person and sued for a jus cogens 
violation. Quite unlike a corporation, a natural person is not likely to be so closely 
intertwined with a State despite that person's nationality. 
79 2017-2018] The Whole Wide World 
liability for ajus cogens violation against a natural person, the nationality of 
the parties and the location of the offending conduct should, even under 
Kiobel and RJR Nabisco, become much less relevant. The fact of a jus 
cogens violation presupposes the offense of every State. By this logic such 
an offense should not offend comity (the main reason that the Supreme 
Court restricted ATS jurisdiction in the first place) or at least not in a way 
that the international community is unprepared to countenance. 
Courts should in no way, of course, assume that Kiobel and RJR 
Nabisco mean nothing for some types of claims brought pursuant to the 
ATS. Kiobel involved a claim of indirect liability for ajus cogens violation 
against a corporation. There, the Court was clearly concerned with the ef-
fect of the extraterritorial application of the ATS on corporations and not 
natural persons. The Kiobel holding, then, should be viewed in the light of 
the Kiobel facts and applied accordingly. RJR Nabisco concerned a RICO 
claim against a corporation. It did not concern ajus cogens claim against a 
natural person. Courts should also limit its utility pursuant to its facts. 
Courts should not assume that either of these cases poses an insurmountable 
barrier to foreign-cubed claims. As the foregoing discussion attempts to 
demonstrate, the ATS continues to be viable for some of these claims-
including the kind perhaps brought by the Yazidis. 

